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Abstract 
This paper aims to explore the relationship between political stability and economic growth 
with a focus on the role of exchange rate regime. We carried out ordinary least squares (OLS), 
Generalized least squares (GLS) and system generalized method of moments (GMM). We are 
based on a panel of 50 countries of which 21 are developed and 29 emerging over the period 
1996-2013. We found that political stability is not very important in explaining economic 
 
growth, while exchange rate flexibility disrupts the economies of emerging countries and 
stimulates economic growth in developed countries. The results also show that political 
stability requires the choice of a flexible exchange rate regime and that exchange rate 
flexibility leads to political stability in order to stimulate economic growth in emerging 
countries. However, for developed countries, political stability accelerates economic growth if 
the exchange rate regime is not too flexible and exchange rate flexibility increases economic 
activity if the level of political stability is low. Our results show that the nature of exchange 
rate regime plays a crucial role in the decision to strengthen political and economic stability. 
The interaction term between political stability and the degree of exchange flexibility is 
statistically significant, confirming the importance of the theoretical and empirical 
foundations raised in this research. 
Keywords: Exchange rate regime; political stability; Economic growth; GMM system; Panel 
data 
 
1. Introduction 
Previous economic theory has focused on the conditions of market functioning without 
regard to the role of the state. It is considered a passive or auxiliary actor in the process of 
economic growth for a long time. In addition, it can encourage trade openness, manage 
savings and investment,  invest in education and know-how in order to ensure macroeconomic 
stability. More recently, several studies have begun to take into account, in addition to the 
disciplinary role of the market, the regulatory role of the State to schematize or model the 
economic situation of the countries. This line of research emphasizes the fundamental role 
that the State can play in coordinating stabilization efforts or good market governance (Boyer, 
2001). Hence the emergence of the concept of "good governance" to emphasize the potential 
 
power of the public authorities in order to achieve a certain level of sustainable and 
accelerated growth. This notion is therefore invented in the context of a new school of thought 
that treats the institutional and regulatory environment as a potential determinant of growth 
and a necessary condition for the take-off of economies. 
Despite the large number of recent developments in this area, most deal separately with 
the effect of political stability or the nature of the exchange rate regime on economic growth. 
To our knowledge, there is no work that has taken into consideration the simultaneous effect 
of these two potential growth determinants in a single study. Indeed, our interest lies in 
overcoming this theoretical and empirical gap by proposing to study the effect of the 
interaction between political stability and the nature of the exchange rate regime on economic 
growth. In other words, we seek to show that the link between political stability and economic 
growth depends on the exchange rate system applied by each country. 
The traditional discussions of exchange rate regimes conducted by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) focused solely on economic factors as determinants of the choice of exchange rate 
policy in developed countries. However, the experience of recent years suggests that a wide 
range of internal and external factors influence this choice. Stein and Jorge (2004) and 
Markiewicz (2006) suggest that domestic political factors influence the choice of exchange 
rate regimes and provide a detailed insight into the dynamics of choice. In other words, 
without denying the importance of economic factors, exchange rate policy depends on the 
political context in which interest groups, electoral and government issues play a major role. 
The purpose of this study is to distinguish between the direct (unconditional) effect of 
political stability on economic growth and the indirect (conditional) effect through the choice 
of the most appropriate exchange rate regime for economic growth. Most empirical studies on 
the determinants of choice of the exchange rate regime and its effects on economic growth, 
 
such as those of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and Eichengreen and Leblang (2005) focus 
only on economic factors related to economic growth. optimal monetary zones and financial 
integration without mentioning the question of governance, particularly political stability. 
Several studies such as those by Broz et al (2008) have dealt with the role of political 
institutions in determining the exchange rate regime according to several visions and contexts. 
Levy-Yeyati et al (2010), Alesina and Wagner (2006) and Carmignani et al (2008) sought to 
determine the most relevant factor in choosing the exchange rate regime that ensures 
economic growth. Indeed, our contribution is to show that the relationship between political 
stability and economic growth depends on the nature of the exchange rate regime applied and 
especially the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate. In other words, political stability 
interacts with exchange rate policy to affect economic growth in an indirect way. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways: First, the majority of studies 
examined the direct effect of political stability on economic growth; nevertheless, it neglected 
the role of exchange regime for 50 emerging and developed countries. In other words, we 
introduce an interaction term between the exchange rate regime (degree of flexibility) and 
political stability in order to show that the relationship between political stability and the level 
of economic growth is conditioned by the nature of the exchange rate regime course. We use 
the exchange rate classification of Reinhart Rogoff (2010) for the period 1996-2013. This 
period coincides with the introduction of the Euro and takes into account changes in exchange 
rate regimes by several countries following the crises of the 1990s. Second, in order to ensure 
the robustness of the results, we conduct regressions on panel data attempting to address the 
issues of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity. We start our analysis with a 
regression using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method passing through an estimate by 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and finally an estimation by the Generalized Moment 
Method (GMM). This approach allows us to analyze the results more reliably and to identify 
 
the type of relationship between political stability and economic growth in a clear, detailed 
and econometrically sound manner. Third, we attempt to calculate the critical thresholds on 
the level of flexibility of the exchange rate regime that requires more political stability 
depending on the nature of the countries (developed or emerging). So, we determine the most 
appropriate exchange rate regime for economic growth according to the level of political 
stability. 
This rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the first section, we present the theory 
that relates to the relationship between political stability and economic growth, the direct and 
indirect effects of exchange rate regime on economic growth and the link between interaction 
between political stability, the exchange rate regime and economic growth. In the third section 
we discuss the empirical methodology, the sources of the data and the results of our estimates. 
In the fourth section we calculate the critical threshold for the degree of exchange flexibility 
and the level of political stability by country type. In the fifth section, we conclude our work 
with a conclusion. 
2. Theoretical foundation 
2.1. Political stability and economic growth 
According to Max Weber's political theory, political stability depends on the legitimate 
use of physical force by the government. If the latter can not provide basic services to people, 
such as security, food and shelter; he loses the power to enforce laws. Which causes political 
instability. The latter is associated with the concept of a failing state (Mommsen, 1992). 
Improvement of institutional and political factors is necessary to ensure the growth of 
nations. These factors explain, among other things, the differences in economic growth rates 
between countries. Indeed, Olson's theory implies that political stability and instability are 
dichotomous. Instability must reach a certain threshold to disrupt distribution coalitions. 
 
Lesser degrees of instability may not trigger this effect. The discontinuous nature of stability 
suggests a quadruple typology of political systems. Each type should have a characteristic 
growth pattern: (1) Chronically unstable states should show continued slow growth. (2) The 
most stable should grow relatively quickly but with a downward trend over time. (3) The 
stabilizing political systems - which are moving into a new political model - should 
experience accelerated growth. (4) Finally, there are diets that become less stable. In fact, 
Olson does not make an explicit prediction on these destabilization systems, but he deduces 
that their growth rate would fall sharply. 
As such, Goldsmith summarizes Olson's theory by the effect of the exchange rate regime 
on economic growth. In 2009 economists defined political instability as events or 
developments that pose a serious extra-parliamentary or extra-institutional threat to 
governments. Political instability is defined as the propensity to collapse a government 
(Alesina et al., 1996). This could be due to conflict or fierce competition between different 
political parties. In addition, government change increases the likelihood of subsequent 
changes. Political instability tends to be persistent or intermittent. 
In this regard, several studies have examined the effect of political instability on  
economic growth (Aisen and Veiga, 2013, Alesina et al., 1996, Barro, 1991, Bashir and Xu, 
2014, Caporale and Leirer, 2010; Cebula 2011, Devereux and Wen 1998, Feng 1997, Fosu 
1992, Goldsmith 1987, London and Poole 1989, Radu 2015). As a result, Alesina et al. (1996) 
studied political instability and growth in a sample of 113 countries during the period 1950-
1982. They found that countries with high levels of political instability have low economic 
growth. This implies that political instability and economic growth are closely linked. 
In fact, an unstable political environment can reduce investment activities and growth. 
Conversely, poor economic performance can lead to the collapse of government and political 
 
unrest. However, they also found that weak economic growth does not affect political 
instability. In addition, Aisen and Veiga (2013) showed that political instability reduces 
economic growth using an advanced panel econometric technique based on the GMM system 
in 169 countries for the period 1960-2004. They also found that political instability 
significantly reduces GDP growth rates. Gurgul and lach (2013) examined the effect of 
political instability on economic growth in 10 CEE countries in transition in the period 1990-
2009. Their results showed that political stability had a negative impact on economic growth. 
On the other hand, few empirical studies have failed to highlight the relationship between 
political stability and economic growth. One of Goldsmith's (1987) earlier empirical work 
attempts to test Mancur Olson's theory, in which political instability is treated as an 
exogenous variable for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Goldsmith, 1987). In another 
study, Londregan and Poole (1989) found no evidence of slower growth as a result of 
increased political instability. On the contrary, they argue that weak economic growth 
increases the likelihood of political instability. 
Indeed, political stability can affect economic growth through various channels. The main 
transmission channel through which political instability can negatively affect economic 
growth is relative to total factor productivity (Aisen and Veiga, 2013). The accumulation of 
physical capital and human capital are also other very important channels. 
If the future of a country becomes uncertain, it may affect the temporal preference rate of 
society as a whole by narrowing its time horizon. As a result, less efficient allocation of 
resources and reduced corporate and government research and development efforts are 
slowing down technological advances. In addition, consumption, public spending and trade 
tend to decrease considerably as a result of chronic political instability in developing 
countries. 
 
In addition, Cooray et al. (2017) studied the role of political institutions, democracy, 
political rights and civil liberties on trade openness and the participation rate of the labor force 
in Africa. Their results suggested that the best political institutions improve the participation 
rate in the labor force. This stimulates the economic development of a country. In other 
words, political stability can influence economic growth in different ways: it can create an 
enabling environment for business prosperity, it can attract domestic and foreign investment, 
and it can create employment opportunities and migrations to cities. All of this leads to an 
increase in aggregate demand and a boost to a country's economic growth. 
2.2. Exchange rate regime and economic growth 
The literature on the relationship between the exchange rate regime and economic growth 
supports a positive relationship in the medium term. The effect of the adopted exchange rate 
system on economic growth can be observed directly through shock adjustments or indirectly 
on investment, trade and financial development. This literature also suggests that the choice of 
the exchange rate regime can not have consequences for long-run economic growth, but the 
impacts essentially influence the shock adjustment process. Aizenman (1994) indicated that 
the effect of the exchange rate regime appears on the speed of adjustment to disturbances and 
on random shocks that can disrupt the internal economy. 
However, subsequent literature suggests that the flexible exchange rate regime positively 
affects economic growth (Sokolov and Mark, 2011), while the fixed exchange rate regime 
leads to an economic recession (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003). On the other hand, the 
intermediate exchange rate is positively correlated with economic growth (McCauley, 2012). 
In this context, some authors analyze the effects of the exchange rate regime on economic 
growth through the study of its effects on the general level of prices or wages. Boyer (1978) 
shows that the magnitude of the change caused by the exchange rate shock is transmitted to 
 
the real economy and represents one of the important determinants of the chosen exchange 
rate regime. He specifies that the fixed regime is more suitable in the case of a purely 
monetary shock, but the flexible regime carries out in case of real shock. He also points out 
that the administered float becomes more appropriate in case of two simultaneous shocks 
(monetary and real). 
In the same vein, Boyer (1978) and Aizenman Joshua (1994) analyzed the effects of 
shocks on consumption without taking into account its effects on output. From a consumer 
point of view, they showed that the fixed exchange rate is preferable in the event of a real 
shock: the greater the effect of the real shock on supply,  the more consumers prefer a fixed 
regime to maintain their prices. consumption levels. In this case, the balance of payments 
mitigates the impact of the shock and minimizes the risks that may threaten the consumer 
basket. But in the case where the real shock affects the supply and demand of money and the 
parity of purchasing power, the desires of a floating regime increase. 
2.2.1. Direct effect of exchange rate regime on economic growth 
The previous economic literature shows that the analysis of the effectiveness or 
importance of an exchange rate regime should not refer only to the real long-run equilibrium 
variables, but the adjustment process must be taken into account short term. In other words, 
the performance of a foreign exchange regime in terms of economic growth can be assessed 
according to the speed of adjustment to the disruptions that affect economic activity. 
In this sense, several studies have focused on the exchange rate regime as an economic 
policy(Aizenman (1994).For example, Friedman (1953) supports the adoption of a flexible 
regime by emphasizing its ability to isolate in case of foreign shocks while this analysis is part 
of a context of low capital mobility. This gap justifies the extensions of the analysis 
conducted by Mundell (1963), which shows that inflationary capacities are inversely 
 
proportional to the mobility of capital. Subsequent research distinguishes between monetary 
and real shock and takes into account the size of the economy in addition to the degree of 
mobility of the factors of production. 
Other studies have been based on the assumption of price rigidity or nominal wages to 
study the choice of the exchange rate regime. Indeed, Boyer (1978) shows that the exchange 
decision depends essentially on the amplitude and the variance of different shocks that can 
affect the economy. He is interested in the study of a small economy exposed to three 
different types of shock: internal, real or monetary and external. He concluded that the nature 
of the monetary or real shock is the primary determinant of a foreign exchange decision, 
while location matters little. Thus, it advocates that a fixed exchange rate regime is more 
suitable in the event of a monetary shock thanks to the intervention of the monetary 
authorities on the exchange markets, whereas a flexible regime is more favored in the event of 
a real shock. 
2.2.2. Indirect effect of the exchange rate regime on economic growth 
Economic theory shows that the exchange rate regime can indirectly influence economic 
growth through other factors such as investment, the volume of international trade, price 
stability, the autonomy of monetary authorities, financial development and economic growth. 
commercial opening. 
Investment: Aizenman (1994) showed that investment tends to increase following the 
minimization of economic uncertainty, real interest rates and exchange rate variability under 
the fixed exchange rate regime. However, the removal of an important adjustment mechanism 
such as the exchange rate may increase protectionist pressure and reduce capital inflows as a 
result of the exchange rate problem, which can negatively affect the level of investment. 
 
However, Funke and Ralf (2001) point out that currency volatility can only have a negligible 
effect on investment volumes without taking into account the type of exchange rate regime. 
International Trade: The exchange rate regime can affect economic growth through the 
volume of international trade, whereas previous studies raise an ambiguous relationship. 
Previous literature focuses on risk aversion to explain the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
economic activity. Some studies argue that volatility can be beneficial for international trade. 
For example, Franke (1991) has shown that exchange rate volatility can create favorable 
conditions for trade and profitable investment. Other studies point out that hedging techniques 
allow companies to minimize currency risk (Viaene and de Vries, 1992). In the same context, 
they found that the use of a single currency by two countries increases trade by more than 
300%. Based on the model of Frankel and Rose (2002), they found that countries with a 
single currency tend to increase their trade. 
Price stability: The objective of economic policy is to choose an exchange rate regime 
that ensures sustainable and sustained economic growth. Indeed, the exchange rate regime 
influences stability and macroeconomic competitiveness. The fixed exchange rate regime is 
considered the most appropriate for achieving the objective of economic stability. However, it 
has limitations because stability is assured only when the economy is not affected by an 
asymmetric shock, while the fixed exchange rate is unable to reduce the effect of a nominal 
exchange rate shock. . Therefore, a fixed exchange rate regime is considered optimal only if 
countries achieve an optimal currency area (OMA), ie, to the extent that price variation and 
factor mobility allow for absorb economic imbalances without recourse to the adjustment of 
the nominal exchange rate. Hence the fixed exchange rate is considered the most suitable for 
reducing inflationary effects. 
 
Financial development: the exchange rate regime could influence economic growth 
through its effects on the level of development of financial markets. Flexibility arrangements 
are usually accompanied by high volatility in the nominal exchange rate, which can have 
negative effects on the real economy unless the financial sector can absorb currency shocks 
and provide agents with hedging instruments appropriate. 
Thus, it is sometimes recommended that an economy must first ensure a relatively 
developed financial system to benefit from a flexible exchange rate regime. Several emerging 
economies have underdeveloped markets and find it difficult to manage a flexible exchange 
rate regime. Indeed, Aizenman and Hausmann (2000) showed that because of the situation of 
their financial markets, exchange rate anchoring gains are more beneficial for emerging 
countries than for industrialized economies. However, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate 
regime in an economy where the financial market is underdeveloped increases the risk of 
suffering a banking crisis. As argued by Chang and Velasco (2000), hard pegging can reduce 
the likelihood of a balance of payments crisis only by increasing the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. Although a walled financial sector is often a necessary condition for adopting a floating 
exchange rate regime, a strong and well-developed financial sector is important for economic 
growth, regardless of the nature of the exchange rate regime. Furthermore, Levine (1997) 
concluded how the level of development of the financial system - reflected in its ability to 
perform certain functions such as mobilizing savings, helping to allocate capital and facilitate 
management risk-can stimulate economic growth through its effects on capital accumulation. 
In addition, empirical evidence supports the view that the proper functioning of the financial 
market contributes to economic growth (Beck et al., 2000). 
Trade openness: the degree of openness of the economy to international markets is also 
seen as a factor influencing economic growth. The literature on endogenous growth 
establishes a positive link between trade openness and economic growth, which means that 
 
the more open countries have more opportunities for higher levels of economic growth. Their 
argument is that these economies are already supposed to develop their capacity to absorb 
technological breakthroughs and take advantage of large markets (Edwards 1993, Barro and 
Sala-i Martin 1995). Thus, to the extent that the nature of the exchange rate regime affects the 
volume of international trade, the degree of exchange rate flexibility could affect economic 
growth. 
2.3. the interaction between political stability and exchange rate regime 
  Several studies point out that the fixed exchange rate regime allows governments to 
conduct a monetary policy that avoids the problem of time inconsistency, increases 
credibility, and maintains a low or moderate rate of inflation (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). In 
this case, the fixed exchange rate regime can be considered as an attractive solution for 
countries with weak institutional capacity or characterized by low political stability and 
seeking to maintain low inflation rates. In other words, the adoption of a fixed regime in the 
case of political instability reduces investor uncertainty, improves the investment environment 
of the country concerned and is a factor stimulating economic growth. 
Drazen (2002) and Frieden (2002) argued that the fixed exchange rate regime allows 
governments in countries with weak institutional frameworks to be less vulnerable to pressure 
from interest groups. This allows policymakers to be more flexible in terms of achieving 
development goals and economic growth rather than allocating public resources in 
unprofitable business in the form of rents. Thus, in terms of credibility, a fixed exchange rate 
regime is an easy commitment to audit and the government would not be able to deal with the 
problem of limited public trust. The disadvantage of this type of regime is that it limits the 
flexibility of monetary policy and, therefore, the tradeoff in this case is between credibility 
and flexibility. This dichotomy could be challenged by the fact that it may be difficult for 
 
governments characterized by institutional fragility to support a fixed regime. Therefore, good 
governance, by reducing corruption and promoting political stability and empowerment of 
politicians, can strengthen the capacity of public authorities to maintain a fixed exchange rate. 
As a result, governance (political stability) reduces the likelihood of speculative attacks on the 
local currency, which can lead to sustained and accelerated economic growth. 
In a context of poor institutional quality (political instability), governments subject to 
pressure from interest groups (or in the presence of wars or social unrest) may not be able to 
support a fixed exchange rate regime inversely to previous arguments . In fact, Edwards 
(1996) has analyzed the conditions under which political stability and government strength 
affect the exchange rate. It concludes that weaker governments working in unstable political 
environments are unable to maintain a fixed regime, which reduces the likelihood of adopting 
such a regime. In this case, poor governance forces some countries to adopt a flexible 
exchange rate regime, although it is not the most appropriate for its objective of economic 
growth especially for small emerging countries. In other words, the regulatory and 
institutional environment influences the choice of the exchange rate regime and subsequently 
the risk of being exposed to the vulnerabilities of global markets, which is reflected in the 
level of economic growth. Thus, the nature of the exchange rate regime affects the effect of 
political stability on economic growth as a flexible regime reduces the need for improved 
governance through increased flexibility to self-regulate short-term imbalances, which is not 
the case for the exchange anchoring regime. 
Inflation and fiscal policy should influence the choice and stability of the exchange rate 
regime (Tornell and Velasco, 2000). They also suggested that the fixed exchange rate regime 
could save countries from tax shocks that require increased spending. On the contrary, they 
suggest that the flexible exchange rate regime imposes greater fiscal discipline, arguing that 
fixed exchange rate regimes postpone the cost of deficits and lead to fiscal and political 
 
imprudence. Thus, we believe that political stability can reduce the adverse effects associated 
with a fixed regime leading to more rapid economic growth. So, political stability can 
stimulate economic growth in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime by imposing more 
restrictions on public spending and reducing budget deficits. On the other hand, in the case of 
a flexible regime, the problem of political instability can be solved (substituted) by greater 
associated budgetary discipline. 
Many transition and developing countries have a blatant corruption problem affecting tax 
revenues, particularly in resource-rich countries (Rafael and Alberto, 1999). A closely related 
literature deals with the influence of interest groups on fiscal policy, arguing that interest 
groups tend to waste income (Lane and Tornell, 1996). This effect stems from the fact that 
uncoordinated interest groups do not take into account the external effects of their behavior 
and that, as a result, the resources are overexploited. On the basis of this literature, we can ask 
ourselves whether a particular exchange rate regime could encourage stable governments to 
be less tolerant of corruption or other forms of appropriation of fiscal resources. In the case of 
a fixed exchange rate regime, the public authorities are obliged to maintain a fixed parity of 
the national currency with respect to the reference currency. This commitment limits the 
waste of resources as a certain level of foreign reserves, mainly from the sale of raw materials 
in many developing countries, is needed to intervene in the foreign exchange market when 
needed. In this sense, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime reduces corruption and 
bureaucracy, and reinforces the effect of political stability on economic growth by improving 
the stock of savings and reversible funds from petrodollars. In addition, in the case of a 
flexible exchange rate regime, the free floating of the local currency reduces the constraints 
on policy makers allowing more corruption and the agents serve their personal interests 
without being sanctioned. Indeed, the flexible exchange rate regime gives agents more 
chances to be more corrupted by the fact that it does not take into account an external 
 
constraint, namely the current account balance and the power parity purchase, which can 
weigh heavily on economic growth. 
A wealth of literature has examined the link between monetary policy and the quality of 
institutions in relation to macroeconomic performance (Rogoff, 2004). This literature has 
focused on the institutional independence of the central bank or other institutional solutions 
leading to low inflation (Siklos, 2000). Again, there is evidence that countries with low 
institutional quality (political instability), particularly those with high levels of corruption and 
rent seeking, often have inefficient monetary policies. In this context, the fixed exchange rate 
regime does not make it possible to achieve both the two internal objectives of reducing 
inflation and the central bank autonomy that is necessary to achieve the objective of price 
stability and the external objective of foreign exchange fixation. So, we can argue that in the 
case of poor institutional quality, exchange rate flexibility provides more autonomy for the 
central bank, allowing price self-regulation in markets positively affecting economic growth. 
Alesina and Wagner (2006) focused on the choice of the exchange rate regime in terms of 
economic growth according to the institutional quality of the countries. Based on the 
classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), they found, on the one hand, a U-shaped 
relationship between corruption and the degree of fixity of the exchange rate, that is to say in 
a in a corrupt environment, exchange fixity decreases economic growth to a certain level of 
corruption from which nominal exchange peg becomes more appropriate for this type of 
savings. On the other hand, countries with good institutions tend to have a flexible exchange 
rate regime. They interpreted this as proof that countries with good institutions can afford to 
have a flexible exchange rate regime, while countries with bad institutions need a fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
 
Thus, we can use the degree of financial exposure to explain the effect of the exchange 
rate regime in relation to political stability on economic growth. The degree of exposure to 
external risk can be defined as an imbalance between the debt and the assets of a country or 
economic agent denominated in different currencies. Private, public, national and foreign 
economic agents consider the fixed exchange rate regime an implicit or explicit guarantee 
against currency risk and external exposure can be accelerated by inadequate supervision and 
regulation of the financial system (Claessens, 2003). . Hence a fixed exchange rate regime 
accompanied by political stability stimulates economic growth by reducing the risks of 
imbalance that may exist through unexpected exchange rate movements in the case of a 
flexible regime. 
In addition to the risks associated with external exposure, the fixed exchange rate regime 
is sometimes subject to speculative attacks and a better quality of institutions (political 
stability) can mitigate these adverse effects. For these reasons, we expect that the effect of 
institutional quality on economic activity will depend on the nature of the exchange rate 
regime, in particular a fixed exchange rate regime requires the improvement of the quality of 
the institutions in order to stimulate economic growth. 
In most underdeveloped countries with a nominal currency peg, companies and banks are 
weakly capitalized and depend on external financing to continue their operations. When 
speculative pressures emerge, the monetary authorities intervene, either to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate regime and allow the depreciation of the national currency, or to increase the 
interest rate in order to limit the movement of capital and stabilize the fluctuation of the rate 
of interest exchange. In this case, political instability implies that a sharp depreciation of the 
currency has adverse effects on economic growth. On the one hand, it deteriorates the net 
assets of companies and banks, and on the other hand it increases the interest rate which, in 
turn, increases the debt service entailing more risk for domestic borrowers. The experience of 
 
Asian countries shows the resilience of economies to such shocks, it can be enhanced by the 
level of political stability. These facts lead us to believe that better institutions (political 
stability) are needed to stimulate and sustain economic growth in countries that adopt a fixed 
exchange rate regime where the market does not operate freely. 
Rodriguez (2017) studied 20 Latin American countries over the period 1985-2010 using 
an ordered probit model. He concludes that the fixed regime is more widely adopted by small 
open economies where trade and financial flows are well controlled in stable and well-
developed institutional and regulatory environments. In the case of a fixed exchange rate 
regime, the good quality of the political institutions and the credibility of the resulting 
monetary authority stimulate economic activity by promoting the savings and confidence of 
the agents, which has a positive impact on the volume investment. It has also proved that 
democratic institutions help to ensure lasting political stability, encouraging the adoption of a 
flexible exchange rate regime for reasons of long-term economic growth. 
3. Data and methodologies 
In this study, we analyze the direct and indirect effects of political stability on the 
economic growth of 50 emerging and developed countries (Insert Table1). We will estimate 
the indirect effects through the exchange channel. Our study contributes to enriching the 
previous literature on economic growth in several directions. We use the exchange rate 
classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for the period 1996-20131. This period 
coincides with the introduction of the Euro and takes into account changes in exchange rate 
regimes by several countries following the crises of the 1990s. 
Our contribution consists of integrating a term of interaction between the exchange 
rate regime and political stability to show that the relationship between political stability and 
 
1 We use the de facto exchange rate classifications originally developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
recently updated by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
 
economic growth is conditioned by the nature of the exchange rate regime. We perform 
regressions on panel data by attempting to solve autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and 
endogeneity problems. We begin an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using a 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimate to arrive at an estimate by the generalized moment 
method (GMM). This approach allows us to analyze our results more reliably and allows us to 
study empirically and in a clear way the relationship between political stability and economic 
growth. 
The advantage of our approach is to evoke an interacting relationship between political 
stability and the exchange rate regime that can affect the traditional relationship between 
political stability and economic growth. To our knowledge, this topic has not captured the 
attention of previous work and may have very important economic implications for policy 
makers. In addition, this approach allows us to determine critical thresholds on the level of 
flexibility of the exchange rate regime that requires more political stability depending on the 
nature of the countries (developed or emerging). Similarly, we can get an idea of the most 
appropriate exchange rate regime for economic growth according to the level of institutional 
development and political stability. 
In this work, we estimate our models using only panel data based on the following 
econometric methods: 
❖ The static panel method 
Panel data econometrics can be used to process double-dimensional information, a 
chronological (time) dimension, and a transversal dimension (statistical entities). He is 
interested in the optimal combination of these sources of information and has many 
advantages. A double-dimensional sample makes it possible to verify the presence of 
unobservable individual or temporal heterogeneity that can be correlated with the explanatory 
 
variables of the model (chronological or transversal series do not control this heterogeneity, 
which leads to a biased estimate). Panel data reduces the risk of multicollinearity due to the 
high variability of data due to a large amount of information. 
❖ Dynamic Panel Method (GMM) 
This method makes it possible to provide solutions to the problems of simultaneity 
bias, inverse causality and omitted variables. A dynamic model is a model in which one or 
more dependent variables are delayed. The GMM method is based on the orthogonality 
conditions between the lagged variables and the error term, both in first and in system 
differences. There are two methods: GMM in first difference and GMM in system. 
, , 1 , ,i t i t i t i ty y X − =  +  +  
✓ GMM in first difference (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
The difference GMM method was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It 
has been widely used in the econometric literature. This method consists in taking for 
each period the first difference of the equation to eliminate the specific effects of each 
individual, then to instrument the explanatory variables of the first difference of the 
equation by their delayed value. Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that this procedure 
can be improved by using the GMM-System estimator. 
✓ GMM in system (Blundel and Bond, 1998) 
According to the simulations proposed by Monte Carlo, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
have shown that the GMM regression estimation in the system is more efficient than the first 
difference GMM estimate. The regression of GMM in system combines for each period the 
equations of the first differences with the equations in level. 
 
In the first difference equation, the variables are instrumented by their delayed values 
of at least one period and in the level equation they are instrumented by their first differences. 
The equation result in system is estimated simultaneously by the generalized moment method. 
, , 1 , ,i t i t i t t i ty y X   − =  +  +  +   
, , 1 , ,i t i t i t t i ty y X   −= + + +  
This method makes it possible to control the specific effects and the potential 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The GMM regression efficiency is based on the 
validation of two hypotheses, the exogeneity of the instruments and the non-correlation of the 
residues. The autocorrelation of the residues is estimated by a test proposed by Arellano and 
Bond. He showed that the difference equation introduces a first-order autocorrelation, 
whereas the verification of the autocorrelation of the residuals is carried out from the second 
order. The validity of the delayed variables as instruments is verified by the Sargan test, this 
test has been replaced by the Hansen test which is robust in the presence of heteroscedastic 
errors. The null hypothesis of the Sargan or Hansen test due to the lack of correlation between 
the over-identified instruments and the error term. 
The GMM method in the system is considered advantageous compared to other 
regression methods for the following reasons: 
• It allows the unobservable specific effect to be controlled because in the 
dataset the first difference must be taken into account to implement in the 
estimation, eliminating the unobservable term from specific countries. 
 
•  In addition, it controls the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables, 
including the lagged value of the dependent variable, by appropriately using 
the deferred values of variables as instruments. 
Empirical work shows the existence of several econometric methods to identify potential 
determinants of economic growth. These studies are distinguished according to the 
econometric method and or according to the sample. Notwithstanding the different methods 
used, all these studies seek to study the behavior and contribution of the economic, financial 
and institutional variables that stimulate the economic growth of the countries. We will then 
analyze some problems that may appear related to the estimation of economic growth such as 
simultaneity. 
The evolution of new econometric methods has allowed researchers to broaden their fields 
of study in the analysis of economic growth. Studies have used the ordinary least squares 
method extensively, and some recent studies have used similar methods, but the problem of 
endogeneity is quickly raised in the analysis of economic growth. 
Economists assume that the problem of endogeneity is linked to the fact that economic 
growth affects certain explanatory variables, namely political stability, the nature of the 
exchange rate regime, because in this case the level of political stability depends on the 
endogenous variable. In this case, the orthogonality condition between the lagged variables 
and the error term is not satisfied since the dependent variable (economic growth) is presented 
on both sides of the equation. This simultaneity leads to biased estimates, which are corrected 
by several econometric methods. 
The literature shows that economists have used many econometric methods to correct this 
bias. The Hausman test (1978) makes it possible to detect the presence of simultaneity and 
emphasizes the need to use the instrumental variable method. In the case of simultaneity, the 
 
OLS method applied to an economic growth function will make it possible to estimate the 
contributions of different variables to explain this problem. To correct simultaneity, the 
technique of instrumental variables and double least triple least squares methods is more 
appropriate for the OLS method. Some studies have shown that the method of double and 
triple least squares is optimal than the OLS method because of the problem of endogeneity. 
In most studies that are based on instrumental variable analysis, double and triple least 
squares and simultaneous equations, have shown that in order to solve the endogenous 
problem, the choice of instruments used does not follow any logic. The GMM method solves 
the problems of endogeneity and determines the validity of the instruments, but this method is 
little applied to the estimation of economic growth. Political stability and the exchange rate 
regime are correlated with the term error. This correlation is due to the simultaneity 
relationship between political stability and the level of economic growth. The OLS method is 
biased and inconsistent even though the term error is not auto-correlated. We therefore use the 
GMM method, based on the work of Arellano and Bond (1991) to overcome the endogeneity 
problem. 
To identify the potential determinants of economic growth, we use a set of variables that 
form a large consensus in the previous literature. Specifically, we use development indicators 
extracted from World Bank statistics and International Monetary Fund (IFS) financial 
statistics in addition to the political stability variable, which is an indicator of the Kaufman et 
al (2010) base. The explanation of the variables used and their sources are presented in Table 
2. 
Insert Table 2 
In this section, we attempt to schematize our empirical approach to estimate the effect of 
political stability on economic growth. First, we perform a simple regression on static panel 
 
data to specify the nature of the model to apply (fixed or random effect). Next, we use the 
generalized moment method (GMM) in order to solve the problem of endogeneity and to 
correct the bias associated with static method regression (OLS). 
We used the previous literature review to derive the following hypotheses to verify: i) 
political stability positively affects economic growth; (ii) exchange rate flexibility stimulates 
economic growth; and (iii) The effect of political stability on economic growth depends on 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
Regarding the choice of variables introduced in the models of economic growth, we 
indicated that the Solow model is generally taken as a basic empirical model of economic 
growth. It includes four determinants of economic growth, initial income, human and physical 
capital accumulation rates, and population growth. For the simplicity of our model, we 
analyze these determinants according to the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) variable. 
We have chosen this indicator because we consider that the attractiveness of foreign direct 
investment depends on demographic variables such as life expectancy, the ratio of labor force 
to total population and the population growth of the countries of destination2. 
Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) have discussed empirical literature on economic 
growth to examine the categories of variables below. 
✓ Macroeconomics and the external environment: 
A stable macroeconomic environment is characterized by low and predictable inflation, 
structural fiscal deficits and a limited gap between the real exchange rate and its equilibrium 
level, which gives important signals to the private sector about the commitment and the 
 
2 Countries with low incomes are assumed to be far from stable and are more likely to experience high levels of 
economic growth according to convergence theories and are more attractive for foreign direct investment. 
 
credibility of the authorities of a country and also enables the efficient management of their 
business in order to increase the profitability of investments. 
In this article, the impact of macroeconomic stability is determined by the real exchange 
rate, the real interest rate, the level of inflation, and financial development. Several studies 
have considered these ratios as measures of economic stability. 
The argument is that all these factors affect private productivity and can reduce savings 
and growth because of the distorting effects of credit and foreign exchange policies. 
The relationship between trade and the external environment is captured by the degree of 
trade openness and measured by imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP (Levine and 
Renelt 1992, Frankel and Romer 1999). A large literature that estimates the impact of 
financial development on economic growth by combining financial development with the 
ratio of private credit to GDP or the market capitalization stock on GDP. this measure is 
sometimes criticized because it does not take into account the complex multidimensional 
nature of financial development, we also consider another indicator, the aggregate index 
created by Svirydzenka. (2016) based on nine indices that summarize the state of depth, 
access and effectiveness of financial institutions and markets. Our goal is to determine which 
financial development measure is better (the more robust). 
✓ The institutions 
The role of institutions in the process of economic growth has been the source of a 
considerable research debate. In this article, we examine the hypothesis that political stability 
is a significant determinant of economic growth. 
We use the de facto exchange rate classifications of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In this 
context, we note that there are three de facto classifications proposed respectively by Reinhart 
 
and Rogoff (2004), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Shambaugh (2004). Our study 
is based on the de facto classification of exchange rate regimes developed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004). Presently, our data on the exchange rate regime are extracted from the updated 
version of this database by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
The advantage of this classification is to guarantee a database over a long period and a 
large number of samples. The classification (IRR) presents 14 categories of exchange rate 
from less flexible to more flexible. The highest values indicate the most flexible exchange 
rates. We chose this classification because it is based on parallel market exchange rate data, 
which makes more sense in the de jure classification that is based on official IMF exchange 
rate data. 
The IMF's classification is based on the choice of regimes announced by countries and 
known in the exchange rate choice literature as de jure categorization. The de jure 
classification is an anticipatory approach in that it allows to observe the political intentions of 
the authorities. This classification makes it possible to evaluate the credibility of political 
authorities and the effects of declarations on the expectations of economic agents. 
Nevertheless, the de facto classification was provided to describe exchange rate practices and 
to capture the choice of exchange rate regimes under the observed data base and not on 
expectations. We therefore use the de facto classification to study the relationship between 
political stability and economic growth. 
Insert Table 3 
3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table (4) shows all the variables used in our model. The main conclusion we can draw 
from table (4.a) is that, on average, the countries studied have a positive growth rate of about 
3%, whereas this rate is negative for some countries. Similarly, while some countries have 
 
low levels of inflation, others are characterized by runaway inflation environments that 
exceed 950%. Our sample is diversified in terms of openness, attractiveness of foreign direct 
investment, financial development and quality of institutions (political stability). This table 
shows that, on average, developed countries have a low economic growth rate of 1.94% (4.b) 
than that experienced by all emerging countries, which exceeds 4.15% (4.c) on average in the 
period studied. This result can be explained by the theory of conditional convergence such 
that countries far from their steady state grow faster than those close to their equilibrium 
point. Thus, the main conclusions that we can draw from this table is that the inflation rate is 
more volatile in emerging countries as it knows aberrant rates and is close to 1000% (4.b) 
while it varies between 1.87% and 15.43% in developed countries. In addition, the political 
stability is more remarkable in the industrialized countries since it reaches 0.93% on average 
and records a maximum positive level 1.90 and a negative minimum level of the order of -
0.60. On the other hand, the level of political stability is generally low in the emerging 
countries since on average this variable is of the order of -0.29 and can even arrive at too low 
levels of -2.83 (4.c). For the other indicators, the descriptive statistics indicate similar results 
and do not detect any major differences between the two country samples. 
Regarding Skewness statistics, we note that all are different from Zero implying that all 
the variables are asymmetric for both the global sample and for the other two country 
samples. This allows us to interpret positive values as a distribution on the right and negative 
values as a distribution on the left. Similarly, the Kurtosis test is used to measure the degree of 
flattening of the distribution. All values of Kurtosis are greater than 3 which shows the 
existence of a sparse and flattened distribution. For the Jarque-Bera test, which is frequently 
used to test the normality of the variables, we can interpret that all the values are significant at 
the 5% threshold, making it possible to reject the hypothesis of normality of the distribution. 
Insert Table 4 
 
Before turning to empirical analyzes that seek to study the relationship between political 
stability and economic growth through the choice of the exchange rate regime, we will study 
the level of dependence between variables. To do this, we present the Pearson correlation 
matrix in Table (5). Our results allow us to conclude that the data do not present a problem of 
multi-collinearity since all the coefficients are weak. They do not exceed 0.5 except for the 
interaction between financial development and the level of openness that reaches 0.594, 
between FDI and financial openness (0.6730), political stability and financial openness that 
reaches 0.549 in the case of emerging countries and between FDI and the level of openness 
which reaches 0.553 in the case of the global sample. Overall, we can accept that our 
variables do not have collinearity problems and that our data can be the subject of unbiased 
and robust tests. 
Insert Table 5 
3.2. Results and discussions  
In this section we attempt to examine the relationship between political stability and 
economic growth using a sample of 50 developed and emerging countries. To do this 
framework, we are based on the specification of the panel data as follows: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tRGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP          = + + + + + + + + + +
 (1) 
Where RGDPit refers to the deflated growth rate of real GDP per capita, RERit is the real 
exchange rate, the real interest rate; INFLit is inflation rates as  measured by the consumer 
price index of country i during period t; OPENit is measured by the sum of exports and 
imports relative to GDP; FINDEVit  is a composite index based on nine indices. It helps to 
verify the effectiveness of financial institutions and markets; FDIit refers to the ratio of 
foreign direct investment to GDP; EXCHANGEit  refers to the degree of flexibility of the 
 
exchange rate regime applied by an economy i to a time t; 𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 refers to political security and 
the absence of violence and manifestation, it is an indicator of the basis of Kaufman et al. 
(2010) ; α is a constant; 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term of the model; 𝜇𝑖  represents the individual effect, 𝛽1 … … … 𝛽𝑛 are the parameters to be estimated, i indicates the individuals (i = 1 ......... 50) and 
t is the time (t = 1996 ... 2013). 
In order to examine the effects of political stability on the level of economic growth 
we start our analysis by the application of a simple regression by the OLS method and then by 
the GMM method in system that we justify the choice. This step consists of evaluating the 
direct effect of political stability. In the second stage, we highlight the indirect effect of 
political stability on economic growth through the choice of exchange rate regime. To do this, 
we introduce an interaction variable that allows us to test the effect of political stability on the 
choice of exchange rate regime. 
3.2.1. Result of estimation of the direct effect of political stability on economic 
growth by the ordinary least squares method (OLS) 
Fisher's test shows that the model is globally significant (column 2). Thus, the 
Haussman test shows that the fixed-effect model is preferable to the one with a random effect. 
By rejecting the hypothesis of homoscedasticity, the Breush-Pagan test reveals the existence 
of heteroscedasticity in the model to be estimated. Similarly, the Wooldridge test shows the 
presence of a problem of autocorrelation3. In order to correct the reported problems of 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlations we present the results of generalized least squares 
(GLS). Thus, in order to take into account the endogeneity problem of Hausman Durbun wu, 
we present in the following subsection the results of the Generalized Moments method 
 
3 Wooldridge's test suggests the rejection of Hypothesis H0, which proves the existence of auto-
correlation at the level of errors. 
 
(GMM) which makes it possible to correct the standard deviations by the Eicker-White 
method. 
Table (6) shows that the variable associated with political stability are negative and 
statistically insignificant. This result should be considered with caution since the estimates are 
not robust and may give biased results. On the other hand, when we took into account the 
problem of heteroscedasticity (column 3), the coefficient becomes positive and significant at 
the 5% threshold. This proves that political stability can enhance economic growth in the 
overall sample studied. This result is confirmed by the previous work of Rodrik et al. (2002) 
who showed that institutions have a larger quantitative effect on human capital accumulation 
than on overall factor productivity. Likewise, they are needed to attract foreign direct 
investment and promote economic development. From these results, we can conclude that 
political stability can be an important determinant for economic development. 
The exchange rate coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level 
(columns 2 and 3). This implies that the flexible exchange rate regime improves economic 
growth in most of the countries studied, while the fixed regime destabilizes the level of 
economic growth. In this sense, Mundell's (1963) showed that the exchange rate regime is a 
prime factor in economic policy. He studied the effect of flexible exchange rate regimes on 
economic policy. He found that this kind of exchange rate regime helps to protect the 
economy from external shocks, but his studies are analyzed in a period characterized by low 
capital mobility. Similarly, Chang and Velasco (2000) showed that the adoption of a fixed 
exchange rate regime reduces balance of payments imbalances, but increases the probability 
of banking crises. On the other hand, the flexible exchange rate alone can reduce the effect of 
these crises when savings are denominated in national currency and the central bank acts as 
lender of last resort. 
 
The real exchange rate variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This means that the fluctuation of the real exchange rate negatively affects economic growth. 
This variable becomes insignificant when the problem of heteroscedasticity of residues is 
taken into account. This result is expected because the unexpected fluctuation of the exchange 
rate in both cases (an appreciation or depreciation) affects the balance of trade and capital 
movements. Hence, (mostly emerging) countries apply a fixed exchange rate regime to reduce 
uncertainty and exchange rate fluctuation that disrupts macroeconomic stability. This result 
confirms the results found by Caputo (2009), who estimated the effect of the de facto 
exchange rate regime on both the persistence of real exchange rate distortions and the average 
real appreciation rate. 
The variable associated with the inflation rate is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This result is logical because in an unstable macroeconomic environment 
characterized by a high level of inflation, expectations are difficult, breaches are generally 
wrong and the long-term investment decision falls. Hence, the negative sign of the inflation 
variable reduces economic growth and economic development. 
The variable that measures the level of financial development is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This can be explained by the fact that a level of 
financial development not associated with good quality of institutions (political stability) can 
have adverse effects on economic growth. In the same context, massive capital movements 
can bring about exchange rate fluctuations that are undesirable by economic agents. 
The financial opening ratio is negative but not significant. The coefficient associated 
with FDI is positive and statistically significant, indicating that foreign direct investment 
stimulates economic growth and promotes the exchange of investment funds between 
countries. 
 
Similarly, the coefficient associated with the real interest rate is negative and 
statistically significant at the conventional thresholds for all models. This result implies that 
any increase in the real interest rate increases the cost of capital and reduces the incentive for 
investment, thus slowing economic growth (crowding out effect). 
3.2.2. Estimation result by the Generalized Moments Method (GMM) 
In this section, we test the effect of political stability on economic growth using the 
GMM generalized moments method based on the following model: 
, , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t iRGDP RGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP         −= +  + + + + + + + + +
 (2) 
Table (7) presents the results of the estimation by the GMM method in system. We 
observe that the results of the autocorrelation test accept the null hypothesis of absence of 
second-order autocorrelation as well as for the validity of the instruments Hansen's (1982) 
over-identification test proves the absence correlation between the error term and the 
instrumental variables. Our results show the validity of the instruments used according to the 
Hansen test and the AR autocorrelation test (2). In fact, the estimates of our model by the 
GMM method in system give statistically and economically satisfactory results. This 
improves the robustness of our conclusions and allows us to better interpret the results of the 
estimation. 
The lagged real GDP per capita growth rate coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that the level of current economic growth depends on 
previous levels in the sense that sustained and sustainable growth enables infrastructure 
development, and encourages and attracts investment. In other words, last year's level of 
growth is an accumulation of wealth and a considerable development of the financial and 
economic infrastructure that leads to increased productivity and increased consumer 
 
purchasing power and leads to a high level of savings to finance the investment of the current 
year. This behavior can be explained by an inter-temporal choice of economic agents 
according to Fisher's theory concerning the notion of wealth according to interest rate and 
income, as well as Friedman's permanent income theory when current consumption depends 
on income later. 
The coefficients of the exchange rate, inflation, interest rate, financial opening and 
financial development keep the same sign as in the estimation by the method OLS and GLS. 
While the coefficient associated with FDI, the exchange rate regime and political stability 
becomes insignificant relative to OLS results. 
3.2.3. Result of estimation of the indirect effect of stability on economic growth 
Several previous studies such as those of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, F (2000) and 
Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) have focused on the study of the relationship between 
political stability and economic growth and the relationship between the regime exchange and 
economic growth, nevertheless, in our knowledge, no work has analyzed the relationship 
between political stability and economic growth conditioned by the choice of exchange rate 
regime. Hence, our contribution is to test the effect of the exchange rate regime on the 
relationship between political stability and economic growth. 
Taking into account equation (1) and in direct relation with our contribution, we 
introduce the interaction term between political stability and the exchange rate regime (SP * 
EXCHANGE) in order to test the effect of political stability on economic growth in the 
presence of exchange regimes. 
To estimate this equation, we use the OLS method to check the significance of the 
coefficients, despite the fact that this method remains biased because it does not take into 
account the problem of endogeneity. For this reason, we switched to the GMM method. 
 
3.2.3.1. Result of estimation by the method OLS 
We estimate in this part the indirect effect of political stability on economic growth 
across the exchange rate channel in the equation that takes the following specification: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , ,( * )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tRGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP SP EXCHANGE           = + + + + + + + + + + +
(3) 
As explained previously, the expected sign of 𝛽8  is ambiguous Si 𝛽8 > 0 the 
conventional view that political stability stimulates economic growth. Alternatively, 𝛽8   <0 
implies support for unconventional vision, in which case political instability is associated with 
improved economic growth. The expected sign of 𝛽7  , which represents the direct effect of 
the exchange rate regime on economic growth, is also theoretically ambiguous. The expected 
sign of the coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽9  is also uncertain and an empirical question. 
If 𝛽9   takes the same sign of 𝛽9  , then the direct effect of political stability will be reinforced 
at higher levels of degree of exchange rate flexibility. On the other hand, if 𝛽9   and 𝛽8   are 
opposite signs, more flexible exchange rate levels will weaken the direct effect of political 
stability. 
In both the OLS and GLS estimates, the applied Fisher test indicates that all models 
are globally significant. The Haussaman test shows that the fixed-effect model is preferable to 
the random-effect model. By rejecting the hypothesis of homoscedasticity, the Breush-Pagan 
test reveals the existence of a heteroscedasticity in the estimated model. Wooldridge's test 
suggests the acceptance of hypothesis H0, which proves the presence of an auto-correlation 
problem at the level of errors (Insert Table 8). 
Table 8 presents the results of the regression of the conditional effect of political 
stability on economic growth by the OLS and GLS method of equation (3) and for the global 
sample. The results imply that the direct effect of the exchange rate regime is insignificant 
 
with a positive coefficient. The coefficient associated with the interaction term between 
political stability and exchange rate flexibility and non-significant (OLS, GLS). In order to 
test whether the effects of political stability, the exchange rate and their interactions differ 
between developed and emerging countries, we estimate the model separately for each 
sample. 
The coefficient associated with political stability is positive and statistically level of 
political stability by the government leads to increased productivity, attraction and incentive 
to investment and leads overall to economic stability. 
3.2.3.2 Result of the estimation by the GMM method 
Using the model of Arellano and Bover (1991), the dynamic model for estimating the 
conditional effect of political stability on economic growth through the exchange rate channel 
takes the following form: 
, , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , ,( * )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tRGDP RGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP SP EXCHANGE           −= +  + + + + + + + + + + +
(4) 
Insert Table 9 
 Table (9) presents the results of the GMM system estimates that take into account 
endogenous variables. The instruments used for system regression are the values of variables 
delayed by at least one period. The test that is usually used to test the validity of the 
instruments is Hansen's, while the second-order auto-correlation test is Arellano and Bond. In 
our case, these two tests validate the instruments used and confirm the robustness of the 
methodology used. More specifically, the Hansen statistic verifies the validation of the 
instruments used and the autocorrelation test R (2) validates the hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation of the residues. The estimation method GMM makes it possible to correct the 
 
bias of the estimation by the method OLS and GLS in the sense that it takes into account 
problem of the endogeneity of the dependent variable. 
 The coefficient associated with delayed growth is statistically significant and positive, 
implying that the growth rate depends positively on its lagging from previous years. Hence, 
we can conclude that a good financial and economic infrastructure, an optimal combination of 
production factors and a better strategy applied to attract and incentivize foreign direct 
investment today will ensure economic growth soon (in the long term). Indeed, state 
intervention is necessary to ensure stability and economic development according to the 
Keynesian theory that supports the inability of the market to self-regulate itself. Table (9) 
shows that most variables retain the same signs found by the OLS and GLS method. 
3.2.4. Result of the estimation by the method OLS and by nature of country 
Table (10) illustrates the results of the OLS, GLS and GMM regression of equation (4) 
for sub-samples from developed and emerging countries where the economic growth rate is 
the dependent variable. The Fisher test shows an overall significance of the fixed-effect 
model. Thus, the Haussaman test shows that the fixed-effect model is preferable to the one 
with a random effect. The Breush-Pagan test confirms the existence of a heteroscedasticity in 
the model to be estimated and the Wooldridge test concludes the presence of an auto-
correlation problem. To account for these problems, we presented in addition to the OLS 
regression the results of the generalized least squares (GLS) and the Generalized Moments in 
System (GMM) method which takes into account the endogeneity of the variable dependent. 
According to the results presented in columns (4) and (7), we find that our data verify the 
hypothesis of absence of second-order auto-correlation (autocorrelation test) AR (2) as well as 
The instruments used are valid (Hansen's over-identification test (1982)), hence the robustness 
of the results obtained. 
 
 It can be seen that the direct effect of political stability on economic growth is 
significant and positive for both types of countries. The coefficient associated with the 
exchange rate regime is statistically significant and positive for developed countries and 
negative for emerging countries. This result shows that the floating exchange rate regime is 
the most appropriate for promoting the economic growth of developed countries. Unlike 
emerging countries the fixed exchange rate is preferable for security reasons against exchange 
rate fluctuations and contagion possibilities. We also note that the coefficient associated with 
the retarded growth rate is positive is statistically significant at the 1% threshold. This result 
implies that the level of current growth depends on past levels in both developed and 
emerging countries. 
Regarding the exchange rate coefficient, it seems to be negative and statistically 
significant for both developed and emerging countries. This means that the high volatility of 
the exchange rate negatively affects economic growth. Regarding the coefficient of inflation, 
it is a potential determinant of the recession in emerging countries and positively affects the 
economic activity of developed countries. Thus, openness positively affects the economic 
growth of the developed countries and negatively the economic activity of the emerging 
countries since they are less developed. 
 We note that the financial development coefficient is not significant for the two 
samples. The variable that measures foreign investment flows is positive and statistically 
significant. This result indicates that investment and capital flows boost productivity and 
promote economic growth. 
For the interest rate coefficient, it is insignificant and positive for the developed 
countries and negative and statistically significant for the emerging countries. This result 
 
implies that the high interest rate prevents agents from investing and leads to a decline in the 
rate of economic growth. 
Table (11) illustrates the effect of political stability on economic growth by type of 
country and by degree of exchange flexibility. All models are globally significant according 
to the Fisher test and the Haussmann test accepts the null hypothesis of a fixed effect. The 
results presented in this table show that political stability positively and significantly affect 
economic growth in developed countries. However, this effect is negatively significant in 
emerging countries. The coefficient associated with the interaction term between the level of 
political stability and exchange rate flexibility is significant suggesting that the effect of 
political stability on economic growth depends on the exchange rate regime. 
In other words, Table (11) illustrates that the coefficient associated with political 
stability is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in developed countries. This 
proves that raising the level of political stability stimulates economic growth in developed 
countries. This result is consistent with previous studies that have shown that good institutions 
can stimulate economic growth by facilitating economic development through an adequate 
legal and regulatory framework. Certainly, political stability and a necessary factor make it 
possible to ensure security and the absence of violence, which encourages investment and 
increases productivity and promotes economic development. 
The coefficients associated with the interaction variable between the political stability 
exchange rate regime are of opposite sign. For developed countries, the interaction coefficient 
is negatively significant at the 5% level. This result shows that the positive effect of political 
stability weakens when the exchange rate says more flexible. In other words, the relationship 
between political stability and economic growth first increases to a certain level of exchange 
flexibility and then decreases (it is a U-reversed relationship). The coefficient associated with 
 
the exchange rate variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies 
that the flexible exchange rate regime is an important determinant for economic growth in the 
industrialized countries, unlike the purely fixed regime that leads to a lower growth rate. 
The positive effect of flexible exchange rate regime is explained by the level of 
political stability of the countries. This result of the interaction variable can be explained in 
another way and that the positive effect of the exchange rate flexibility is weakened with a 
higher level of political stability whereas the positive effect of a high rigidity of change can be 
considered as an important factor to ensure a high level of political stability. Similarly, these 
findings can confirm a U-reversed relationship between the degree of exchange rate flexibility 
and economic growth according to the level of political stability of countries and proves that 
the degree of exchange rate rigidity is more preferable for growth in the economy framework 
of political stability and for developed countries. 
For emerging countries, we observe that the effect of political stability on economic 
growth is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result shows that the level 
of political stability is low in these countries and suffers from a problem of political security, 
the agents do not respect the laws and the rules imposed by the State and the parallel markets 
are very developed in these economies. . The establishment of a new legal framework and the 
fight against stowaways and all attempts to make laws and institutionalization (institution 
building) can negatively affect investment decisions and even lead to capital flight that comes 
into the Most cases of money laundering and corrupt behavior. 
According to our results the effect of political stability on economic growth depends 
on degree of flexibility such that the negative effect of political instability weakens with the 
degree of exchange flexibility and the positive effect of political stability can be felt for high 
levels of exchange rate flexibility in emerging countries. These results allow us to conclude a 
 
U-shaped relationship between the level of political stability and economic growth according 
to the level of exchange rate flexibility adopted by emerging countries.  
Indeed, increasing political stability reduces the pace of economic growth as the 
exchange rate becomes more flexible to a certain critical level beyond which the relationship 
between improving political stability and the level of growth becomes positive and important. 
Similarly, the exchange rate flexibility in emerging countries is associated with price 
fluctuations and destabilizes economic growth, a negative and significant effect at the 5% 
threshold of the EXCHANGE variable. The coefficient of the interaction variable between SP 
and EXCHANGE is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that the 
negative effect of political stability is weakened with exchange rate flexibility and the positive 
effect of exchange fixity can enhance the level of political stability. We can conclude that the 
fixed exchange rate regime is a necessary element to ensure a desirable level of political 
stability that favors the economic growth of emerging countries. Most controls variables keep 
the same signs as the overall sample estimate. 
4. Determination of critical thresholds 
To determine the critical thresholds of the variables of interest that we have already 
studied their interactions, we are based on the estimation by the GMM method presented 
in equation (4): 
, , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , ,( * )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tRGDP RGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP SP EXCHANGE           −= +  + + + + + + + + + + +
(4) 
 4.1. Determination of the critical threshold for the degree of exchange flexibility 
by country type: 
8 9 0
dRGDP
EXCHANGE
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 = + =
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Coefficients 𝛽8 𝛽9 Degree of critical flexibility (− 𝛽8𝛽9) 
Global sample -.2130245 .01302 16.361 
Developed countries 1.231442 -.081953                            15.026 
Emerging countries -1.409295 .1509112                            9.338 
 
These results show that any increase in the level of political stability favors economic 
growth in developed countries as long as the level of exchange rate flexibility is less than 
15,026. Beyond this threshold of flexibility, increasing the level of political stability does 
not stimulate economic growth but, on the contrary, can negatively affect economic 
growth (recession). For emerging countries the relationship is different such that political 
stability reduces the level of economic growth only when the level of exchange rate 
flexibility is lower than 9.338 but from this level of flexibility of the exchange rate regime 
any strengthening of the level of the Political stability promotes economic development. 
 
4.2. Calculation of the critical threshold for the level of political stability by 
country type 
7 9 0
dRGDP
SP
dEXCHANGE
 = + =
 
so 
7
9
SP= -

  
 
Calculation of the critical threshold for the level of political stability 
Coefficients 𝛽7 𝛽9 Level of critical political stability (− 𝛽7𝛽9) 
Global sample -.0048969 .01302 0.376 
Developed countries .1111419 -.081953 1.356 
Emerging countries -.2905179 .1509112 1.925 
 
According to these results we can conclude that exchange rate flexibility in developed 
countries stimulates economic activity as soon as the level of political stability does not 
exceed 1.356. This result shows that any additional flexibility in the exchange rate can 
negatively affect the level of economic growth. For emerging countries, when the level of 
political stability is below 1.925, the fixed exchange rate is more appropriate for economic 
growth. On the other hand, if governments decide to strengthen the quality of institutions and 
ensure a higher level of political stability, the floating exchange rate regime becomes more 
optimal and improves the economic growth of emerging countries. 
Conclusion  
The aim of the present study is to examine the direct effect of political stability on 
economic growth.  Then, we analyze the role of exchange regime in the relationship between 
political stability and economic growth for 50 countries, 21 developed countries and 29 
emerging countries during period 1996-2013. Our results showed that political stability alone 
can not explain economic growth. We can conclude that this conclusion contradicts the results 
of some previous studies that prove that political stability improves economic growth without 
taking into account the effect of the exchange rate regime (Mădălina Radu 2015). 
 
Our results showed that the flexible exchange rate regime destabilizes the economic 
activity of emerging countries while the fixed exchange rate regime favors the economic 
growth of these countries. As a result, the fixed exchange rate regime stimulates economic 
growth in emerging countries where market mechanisms do not work or weakly and the 
intervention of the monetary authority in the foreign exchange market can ensure economic 
stability. Hence our results are based on the assumptions of the Keynesian theory that requires 
the intervention of the state to achieve full employment and ensure stable and sustained 
economic growth in the long term. For developed countries, the floating exchange rate regime 
stimulates economic growth in a way that is too significant and the autonomy of the 
supervisory authorities that ensures instant and more effective intervention in the markets 
concerned. 
In this respect, political stability is a potential determinant of economic growth in 
developed countries provided that the exchange rate regime is not purely flexible. Political 
instability may be beneficial in emerging markets provided that a fixed exchange rate regime 
is applied and political stability ensures more growth if such countries choose to relax their 
exchange rate policies. Otherwise, emerging countries can benefit from political stability if 
they choose a high level of exchange rate flexibility. To achieve these results, we used a static 
regression that analyzes the direct relationship between the level of political stability and 
economic growth and indirect relationship across the exchange rate channel. First, we 
performed an OLS regression and then proceeded to GLS regression because of a 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation problem according to the Breusch-Pagan and 
Wooldridge tests. Finally, we carried out an analysis by the GMM method which makes it 
possible to take the problem of endogenicity while testing for the validity and reliability of the 
instruments used. 
 
We can conclude that political stability improves the economic growth of developed 
countries up to a certain higher threshold of exchange rate flexibility beyond which the 
strengthening of the level of political stability becomes inappropriate to the economic 
situation. Likewise, the increase in degree of exchange rate flexibility is important for 
economic growth up to a certain level of maximum political stability that must not be 
exceeded to ensure economic development. 
For emerging countries, political stability only becomes important to accelerate 
economic take-off from a certain level of exchange flexibility. Similarly, high flexibility and 
change requires a well-developed institutional framework and tighter political stability to 
ensure market efficiency and better allocation of resources. 
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Table 1: Country Classification by Type of Exchange Rate Regime Applied  
Developed countries  Emerging countries 
Australia  
Austria 
Belgium 
 Canada 
 Denmark 
 Finland 
 France 
 Germany 
 Greece 
 Ireland 
 Italy  
Japan 
 Netherlands 
 New Zealand 
 Norway 
 Portugal 
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 Switzerland 
 United Kingdom 
 United States 
Argentina 
 Brazil 
 Bulgaria 
 Chile 
 China 
 Colombia 
 Croatia 
 Czech Republic 
 Egypt 
 Hong Kong 
 Hungary 
 India 
 Indonesia 
 Korea Rep 
 Malaysia 
 Mexico 
 Morocco 
 Pakistan 
 Peru 
 Philippines 
 Poland 
 Russia 
 Singapore 
 South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
 Thailand 
 Tunisia 
 Turkey 
Venezuela 
Source: Reinhart Rogoff(2004) 
 
Table 2: Descriptions and Data Sources 
The variables      Definition of the variables       Sources  
RGDP Deflated growth rate of real GDP per capita world Bank 
EXCHANGE It is the regime or system of exchange that 
represents all the rules and instruments that 
organize the framework in which the nominal 
value of the national currency is determined. It is 
between 1 and 14, the highest value of which 
corresponds to an economy that applies a more 
flexible exchange rate system (more floating 
regime). 
Ilzetzki,  Reinhart et Rogoff (2008) 
 
 
SP This variable measures the probability of 
destabilization or overthrow of government by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including 
terrorism, it is an indicator of the basis of 
Kaufman et al (2010). 
 
world Bank  
RER This variable refers to the real exchange rate, 
defined as the relative price of tradable and non-
tradable goods in an economy 
International Financial Statistics: IFS   
INFL This is the rate of inflation calculated on the 
basis of the consumer price index   
International Financial Statistics: IFS    
RIR This is the real interest rate, corresponds to the 
inflation-adjusted loan interest rate (GDP 
deflator) 
World Bank and International Financial 
Statistics: IFS   
 
FINDEV It is a composite index based on nine indices. It 
helps to verify the effectiveness of financial 
institutions and markets. It varies between 0 and 
1 and developed countries have the highest 
scores. 
IMF/Data.world 
https://data.world/imf/financialdevelopment- 
fd  
 
 
OPEN It indicates the degree of trade openness 
measured as the sum of exports and imports 
relative to GDP. 
world Bank   
FDI This is foreign direct investment measured by 
the ratio of net inward flows of foreign 
investment to GDP. 
world Bank   
 
 
 
Table 3: Exchange Rate Classification Algorithm (de facto classification of IRR) 
Typologies of exchange rate regimes 
Natural classification Fine classification(IRR) Aggregate classification 
No separate legal course 1 Fixed exchange regime 
Pre announced peg or currency 
board arrangement 
2 
Pre-announced horizontal band that 
is narrower or equal to +/- 2% 
3 
De facto peg 4 
Pre-announced crawling peg 5 intermediate exchange regime  
Crawling pre-announced band that 
is narrower or equal to +/- 2% 
6 
Crawling peg de facto 7 
Crawling de facto band that is 8 
 
narrower or equal to +/- 2% 
Crawling pre-announced band that 
is wider or equal to +/- 2% 
9 
Crawling de facto band that is 
narrower or equal to +/- 5% 
10 
Moving band that is narrower or 
equal to +/- 2% (ie allowing both 
appreciation and 
depreciation over time) 
11 
Managed float 12 flexible exchange regime 
Freely floating 13 
Freely falling 14 
Source :Gnimassoun,B(2015) 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Analyzes 
a. Global sample 
  RGDP RER INFL RIR FINDEV OPEN FDI EXCHANGE SP 
Mean  3.2265  99.4650  6.6702  5.3673  0.5497  84.8455  4.5047  7.4444  0.2225 
 Maximum  18.2870  234.614  958.527  93.9374  1.0000  458.332  87.4430  15.000  1.9000 
 Minimum -13.127  46.2260 -5.9920 -70.964  0.1446  14.9330 -16.071  1.0000 -2.8300 
 Std. Dev.  3.4224  16.9048  33.4974  9.4796  0.2247  69.0837  7.0129  4.3636  0.9502 
 Skewness -0.5940  2.3842  25.730  1.8232 -0.0002  2.9562  4.4162 -0.2897 -0.7002 
 Kurtosis  5.2943  18.487  726.614  31.9016  1.7519  13.2333  34.4136  1.6203  2.7656 
 Jarque-Bera  250.328  9847.46 197349  31822.5  58.4154  5237.96  39931.1  83.9772  75.6029 
 Probability  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 Observation     900    900     900 900 900 900 900    900    900 
 
 
b. Developed countries 
  RGDP RER INFL RIR FINDEV OPEN FDI EXCHANGE SP 
 Mean  1.9498  98.0750  1.8723  3.7120  0.7479  76.6417  4.70256  6.1296  0.9320 
 Maximum  6.5570  151.858  15.4340  12.7166  1.0000  202.850  87.4430  13.0000  1.9000 
 Minimum -8.5390  71.5810 -5.2050 -5.6348  0.3840  18.7560 -5.6710  1.0000 -0.6000 
 Std. Dev.  2.3953  10.4656  1.9229  2.5911  0.1169  38.9388  7.9611  5.1730  0.4607 
 Skewness -1.3357  1.0452  1.3615  0.0672 -0.170  1.0742  4.7388  0.2167 -0.7456 
 Kurtosis  5.5507  6.9207  11.2002  4.1933  2.5862  3.5597  38.4120  1.2168  3.4086 
 Jarque-Bera  214.877  310.943  1175.88  22.7138  4.5262  77.6368  21165.4  53.0422  37.6570 
 Probability  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1040  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 Observations 378    378    378   378    378   378   378    378 378 
 
c. Emerging countries 
 
  RGDP RER INFL RIR FINDEV OPEN FDI EXCHANGE SP 
 Mean  4.1510  100.471  10.1446  6.5659  0.4061  90.7862  4.3614  8.3965 -0.2912 
 Maximum  18.2870  234.614  958.527  93.9374  0.8539  458.332  50.7420  15.000  1.3500 
 
 Minimum -13.1270  46.2260 -5.9920 -70.964  0.1446  14.9330 -16.071  2.0000 -2.8300 
 Std. Dev.  3.7444  20.2840  43.6429  12.1150  0.1676  83.9871  6.2411  3.3660  0.8802 
 Skewness -0.9546  2.1693  19.8451  1.2246  0.7903  2.5961  3.6579 -0.4831 -0.3513 
 Kurtosis  5.7203  14.6248  429.114  20.096  2.9079  9.5985  20.6274  2.3604  2.4846 
 Jarque-Bera  240.244  3348.66  398348  6488.07  54.5353  1533.38  7922.42  29.2031  16.5174 
 Probability  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002 
 Observations   522  522   522 522    522 522   522     522   522 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix  
a. Global sample 
 RGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP 
RGDP 1.0000         
RER -0.0304    1.0000        
INFL             -0.0464   -0.1560    1.0000       
RIR -0.1018 0.0806 -0.3016 1.0000      
OPEN 0.0355    0.0048   -0.0466    -0.1021 1.0000     
FINDEV -0.2119    -0.0447   -0.1682    -0.1164 0.2495   1.0000    
FDI 0.0492    0.0106   -0.0379    -0.0483 0.5531    0.1316    1.0000   
EXCHANGE 0.0670   -0.1006    0.0077   0.1124 -0.1521    0.0100   -0.2206    1.0000  
SP -0.0904   -0.0177  0.0036    0.0717 0.2291    0.1746    0.1745   -0.1244    1.0000 
 
b.  Developed countries 
 RGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP 
RGDP 1.0000         
RER -0.2297    1.0000        
INFL 0.2596   -0.3958    1.0000       
RIR 0.0397 0.0065 -0.0839 1.0000      
OPEN 0.0397   -0.1285   -0.0245 -0.1901 1.0000     
FINDEV 0.0083    0.1448 -0.1064   -0.3845 0.1061   1.0000    
FDI 0.0938   -0.0797   -0.0034   -0.1975 0.4977   0.0848   1.0000   
EXCHANGE 0.1481    0.2110    0.0573   -0.0173 -0.3358    0.2717 -0.2363    1.0000  
 
SP 0.2614   -0.0446    0.1326    0.0094 0.3834   -0.1883    0.1226    0.1320    1.0000 
 
c. Emerging countries 
 RGDP RER INFL RIR OPEN FINDEV FDI EXCHANGE SP 
RGDP 1.0000         
RER -0.0143    1.0000        
INFL -0.1084   -0.1751 1.0000       
RIR -0.1879 0.0785 -0.3308 1.00001      
OPEN -0.0042 0.0195 -0.0638  -0.1165 1.0000     
FINDEV 0.0536 -0.0225 -0.1337 0.0328 0.5943 1.0000    
FDI 0.0453     0.0578 -0.0519   -0.0289 0.6730 0.3810   1.0000   
EXCHANGE -0.1351   -0.3420 -0.0434 0.1341 -0.1544  0.1460 -0.2036 1.0000  
SP -0.0547 0.0269 -0.0671    -0.0018 0.5493 0.4743 0.4382 -0.0135 1.0000 
 
 
Table 6: Results of estimation by the OLS method 
Variables Fixed effect  Least Generalized Squares (LGS) 
   
RER -.0352626   (0.000) .0067354 (0.338) 
INF -.0176989    (0.000) -.0090106 (0.008) 
RIR      -.0940958    (0.000)                  -.0615388(0.000) 
OPEN -.0099509      (0.148) -.0016203 (0.486) 
FINDEV -1.099468  (0.517) -3.522999 (0.000) 
FDI .0568067    (0.005) .0424404 (0.004) 
EXCHANGE  .1424943  (0.021)  .0778157 (0.002) 
SP  .3140556    (0.368 ) .2535342 (0.044) 
Constant 9.680545   (0.000) 3.94896 (0.000) 
Observation 900 900 
Number of groups 50 50 
R-squared 0.0149  
R-squared within 0.0871  
R-squared between 0.0144  
 Fischer Test 
prob> 𝐹 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 
 prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 27.27 (0.0003)  
 Breusch pagan Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 3856.84 (0.0000)  
 Wooldridge Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 35.532 (0.0000)  
 Hausman  Durbun wu Test 
Prob>chi2 
119.69 
0.0000 
 
 
Note: The values in parentheses are the P-value. 
Table 7: Result of the estimation by the GMM method in system 
Variables GMM 
, 1i tRGDP −  
.2146241  (0.000) 
RER .0016462 (0.808) 
INF -.0089002 (0.000) 
RIR -.0503706(0.013) 
OPEN -.0009916   (0.603) 
FINDEV -3.238329   (0.000) 
FDI .0284143 (0.176) 
EXCHANGE -.0027514   (0.931) 
SP -.1138868 (0.428) 
Constant 4.405169 (0.000) 
Observation 850 
Number of groups 50 
 Hansen Test 
25.01 
Prob > chi2 
(0.103) 
AR(2) -2.38  (Pr > z =  0.118) 
Note: The values in parentheses are the P-value. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Result of estimation of the indirect effects of political stability on economic growth by the OLS 
method 
Variables Fixed effect Least Generalized Squares (LGS) 
   
RER -.0333724   (0.000) .0067614 (0.337) 
INF -.0177823 (0.000) -.0090732   (0.008) 
RIR       -.0932275(0.000)                  -.0617611(0.000) 
OPEN -.0100605 (0.144) .0017714 (0.454) 
FINDEV -1.348901 (0.431) -3.531617 (0.000) 
FDI  .0577088    (0.005) . .0424359   (0.005) 
EXCHANGE .1936313 (0.733) .1414768 (0.627 ) 
SP .1324374 (0.033) .0837881 (0.004) 
EXCHANGE*SP . -.0612665    (0.256) -.0125948   (0.669 ) 
Constant 9.512792 (0.000) 3.879617 (0.000) 
Observation 900 900 
Number of groups 50 50 
R-squared 0.0153  
R-squared within 0.0885  
R-squared between 0.0119  
 Fischer Test 
prob> 𝐹 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 27.64 0.0000  
Breusch pagan Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 4244.01  
(0.0000) 
 
Wooldridge Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 37.098 0.0000  
 
 Hausman  Durbun wu Test 
Prob>chi2 
158.60  
0.0000 
 
Note: The values in parentheses are the P-value. 
Table 9: Result of indirect effect estimation of political stability by the GMM method 
Variables                                                                                         MMG 
, 1i tRGDP −  
.2148733 (0.000) 
RER .0011367 (0.863)   
INF -.0088856 (0.000) 
RIR                                                                                   -.0506513(0.013) 
OPEN  -.001063 (0.586) 
FINDEV -3.207206 (0.000) 
FDI .0284737 (0.176) 
EXCHANGE -.0048969 (0.878) 
SP                                                                                    .2130245 (0.023)   
SP*REGIME .01302 (0.621) 
Constant 4.465602 (0.000)   
Observation                                                                                          850 
Number of groups                                                                                                          50 
Hansen Test 
Prob > chi2 
24.87 
0.1130   
AR(2) -2.37   
Pr > z 0.118 
Note: Values in parentheses are P-Value 
Table 10: Direct effect of political stability on economic growth by country type 
 Developed countries Emerging countries 
Variables OLS GLS GMM OLS GLS GMM 
 , 1i t
RGDP −  
  .3879045   
(0.000) 
   .2486758   
(0.000) 
RER -.0421708 
(0.012)     
-.0375049 
(0.003) 
-.0267079   
(0.010) 
-.0376046 
(0.111 ) 
-.0068681    
(0.423 ) 
-.0100428 
(0.361    ) 
INF .2410439 
(0.001) 
.0315178 
(0.579) 
.090223   
(0.114 ) 
-.0162939 
(0.000   ) 
-.0136802 
(0.000)     
-.0195551 
(0.000    ) 
RIR .1369893 
(0.124) 
.0379935 
(0.433) 
.0785549 
(0.214) 
-.0890062 
(0.000) 
-.0727974 
(0.000) 
-.1063626 
(0.000) 
OPEN .0327322 
(0.009) 
.0035713   
(0.043) 
.0043539   
(0.098) 
-.0072979 
(0.399) 
-.0129976 
(0.001) 
-.0190643 
(0.010) 
FINDEV -2.055668 
(0.299) 
1.62792 
(0.194) 
2.378282 
(0.111) 
2.505911 
(0.322) 
3.563252 
(0.325) 
5.769741 
(0.216) 
FDI .0534928 
(0.004) 
.0327917 
(0.023) 
.0370158 
(0.002) 
.0882907 
(0.017) 
.0729657 
(0.032) 
.1098055 
(0.014) 
EXCHANGE .0036918 
(0.067) 
.0833243 
(0.011) 
.031081 
(0.062) 
-.2936826 
(0.000) 
-.2652167 
(0.000) 
-.3597577 
(0.000) 
SP 2.102287 
(0.000 ) 
.9671632   
(0.005) 
.8390259 
(0.001) 
.7250146 
(0.025 ) 
.0194927   
(0.018) 
.145226 
(0.019) 
Constant 6.983684 
(0.010 ) 
2.967858 
(0.043) 
.6721567 
(0.639) 
10.61562 
(0.000) 
7.157923 
(0.000) 
9.053815 
(0.000) 
Observation 378 378 357 522 522 493 
Number of groups 21 21 21 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.0892   0.0633               
 
R-squared within 0.2111   0.1355   
R-squared between 0.0024   0.0004   
 Fischer Test 
prob> 𝐹 0.0000   0.0000   
Hausman Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 31.18 (0.0000)   19.33 (0.0132)   
Breusch pagan Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 206.23 (0.0000)    1135.26 (0.0000)   
 Wooldridge Test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 30.176 (0.0000)   23.751 (0.0000)   
Hausman  Durbun 
wu Test 
Prob>chi2 
63.53 
(0.0000) 
  95.96 
(0.0000) 
  
 Hansen Test 
Prob > chi2 
 
 
 18.21 
(0.151) 
  15.24 
(0.155)   
AR(2) 
Pr > z 
  -2.27  
(0.123) 
  -2.99 
(0.113) 
Note: Values in parentheses are P-value 
 
 
Table 11: the indirect effect of  political stability on economic growth through the exchange regime 
 Developed countries Emerging countries 
Variables OLS GLS GMM OLS GLS GMM 
, 1i tRGDP −  
  .3970066 
(0.000) 
  .1548128  
(0.000) 
RER -.0374006 
(0.025) 
-.0371958 
(0.003) 
-.0216663 
(0.070) 
-.0379899 
(0.000) 
-.0063766   
(0.456) 
-.0074983 
(0.356) 
INF .1950735 
(0.006) 
.0241999 
(0.668) 
.1024511 
(0.062) 
-.0166405 
(0.000) 
-.0133781 
(0.000) 
-.0136768 
(0.000) 
RIR .1360713 
(0.024) 
.0407582 
(0.396) 
.0925317 
(0.161) 
-.0884482 
(0.000) 
-.0717881 
(0.000) 
-.0687517 
(0.000) 
OPEN -.0286651 
(0.022) 
-.0028242 
(0.454) 
-.0032128 
(0.252) 
-.006667 
(0.440) 
-.0115678 
(0.002) 
-.0132617 
(0.002) 
FINDEV -1.718801 
 (0.383) 
1.540656 
(0.217) 
2.504397 
(0.015) 
1.598591 
(0.534) 
3.42747 
(0.007) 
3.946614 
(0.007) 
FDI .0572648 
(0.002) 
.0311392 
(0.031) 
.0356663 
(0.001) 
.0925419 
(0.012) 
.0856847 
(0.013) 
.0611427 
(0.216) 
EXCHANGE .2385605 
(0.008) 
.1729195 
(0.005) 
.1111419 
(0.015)  
-.2325324   
(0.010) 
-.2218216 
(0.000) 
-.2905179 
(0.000) 
SP 3.331161 
(0.000) 
1.493798 
(0.002) 
1.231442 
(0.000) 
- .922215 
(0.011) 
 -1.21879 
(0.050) 
-1.40929 
(0.010) 
SP*EXCHANGE -.2170034 
(0.011 ) 
-.0921519 
(0.009) 
-.081953 
(0.031) 
.1877691 
(0.066) 
.12882 
(0.048) 
.1509112   
(0.067) 
Constante 4.701472 
(0.094) 
2.496455 
(0.093) 
-.4803722 
(0.789) 
10.42145 
(0.000) 
6.550461 
(0.000) 
6.581036  
(0.000) 
Observation 378 378 378 522 522 493 
Number of groups 21 21 21 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.1180   0.0777   
R-squared within 0.2257   0.1416   
R-squared between 0.0319   0.0049   
  Fischer Test 
prob> 𝐹 0.0000   0.0000   
Hausman Test  
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 33.38 0.0000   16.39 0.0592   
 
Breusch pagan Test  
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 344.10 0.0000   767.22 0.0000   
Wooldridge test 
prob> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 30.752 0.0000   23.663 0.0001   
Hausman Durbun 
wu Test 
Prob>chi2 
68.04 
0.0000 
  97.45 
(0.0000) 
  
Hansen  test 
Prob > chi2 
 
 
 17.99  
(0.155) 
  16.92  
(0.150) 
AR(2) 
Pr > z 
  -2.30  
(0.222) 
  -1.80  
(0.172) 
Note: Values in parentheses are P-value 
 
 
 
